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Introduction 
Analysis of the current state of project management shows a significant increase in the number of 
projects implemented in the spheres of construction, public administration, energy, consulting, and digi-
tal technologies. Professional project management allows to effectively allocate responsibilities and re-
sponsibilities between project participants, save money and time, reduce risks. Understanding the im-
portance of future development, the heads of organizations are increasingly using project management 
methods to create competitive advantages, and in the applied theory of management of organizational 
systems, more attention is paid to the teamwork of the organization's personnel. 
The organization of teamwork is one of the fundamental principles of project management, which 
involves the formation of teams, the organization of their effective work and interaction with the goal of 
uniting and coordinating the efforts of all the performers involved in the project. 
 
The urgency and scientific significance of the issue 
The problems of the formation and functioning of teams are investigated in sociology – in the works 
of R.M. Andreeva, T.P. Galkina, A.V. Zhutkina, K. Levina, A.I. Prigogine; psychology –  
in the works of V.V. Avdeeva, M.Yu. Gubieva, V.V. Isaeva, V.I. Kornienko, Yu.V. Sinyagin,  
K. Foppel, R. Chaldini, S. Tannenbaum, R. Beard, E. Salas; management – in the works of  
T.Yu. Bazarov, S.A. Barkalov [1, 2], P. Drakker, V.N. Mikheeva. 
The results of the study of mathematical models of the formation and functioning of teams are  
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Analysis of the current state of project management shows a significant increase in the number 
of projects implemented in the spheres of construction, public administration, energy, consulting, 
and digital technologies. Professional project management allows to effectively allocate responsibili-
ties and responsibilities between project participants, save money and time, reduce risks. Under-
standing the importance of future development, the heads of organizations are increasingly using 
project management methods to create competitive advantages, and in the applied theory of mana-
gement of organizational systems, more attention is paid to the teamwork of the organization's per-
sonnel. 
An important task in the management of the project team is the formation of a system of incen-
tives for its participants, whose task is to ensure the implementation of the project on time without 
additional budget expenditures. In order to maintain the motivation of project team members, indi-
vidual and unified incentive schemes. 
The disadvantage of individual incentive systems is, firstly, unequal conditions for encouraging 
different groups of performers, and secondly, the danger of manipulation, that is, deliberate distor-
tion of information on the amount of work and costs transferred from the members of the project 
team. In order to exclude distortion of information and reduce tension in the project team, unified in-
centive schemes apply when the incentive mechanism is the same for all performers. Intermediate 
position is occupied by the group incentive schemes, when a number of project operations are divid-
ed into groups, for executors of each of which a unified incentive system is applied. 
The article considers jumping unified stimulation systems, and the problem of choosing the op-
timal group incentive system is solved. 
Keywords: project, team, cumulative unified incentive systems, group incentive schemes. 
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reflected in the works of B.N. Burkov [3], D.A. Novikova [4, 5], A.G. Chkhartishvili, V. Holmstrom,  
J. Marshak, R. Radner. The current state of mathematical models of the formation and functioning of 
teams includes several research directions: assignment models that use, in the main, the optimization 
apparatus for solving the tasks of forming the composition of teams, the distribution of roles and  
the scope of work; game-theoretic models; simulation models; Reflexive models using the apparatus of 
the theory of reflexive games. 
An important task in the management of project teams is the formation of incentive systems for pro-
ject team members. In this case, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of the project activity 
[1, 2]. To the conditions of the project it is unproductive to apply methods of stimulating current work. 
The task of the incentive system in project management is to ensure that the project is completed on time 
without additional budget expenditures. The calculation of incentive payments should be based on not 
only individual, but also team performance indicators. 
When creating incentive systems for project team members, it is necessary to take into account  
the specifics of the project activity. To the conditions of the project it is unproductive to apply methods 
of stimulating current work. The task of the incentive system in project management is to ensure that  
the project is completed on time without additional budget expenditures. The calculation of incentive 
payments should be based on not only individual, but also team performance indicators. 
In order to maintain the motivation of project team members, individual and unified incentive 
schemes are applied. The disadvantage of individual incentive schemes is, firstly, unequal conditions for 
encouraging different groups of performers, which can cause tension in the project team. Secondly, there is 
a danger of manipulation, that is, deliberate distortion of information on the amount of work and costs 
transferred from the members of the project team. In order to exclude distortion of information and reduce 
tension in the project team, unified incentive schemes apply when the incentive mechanism is the same for 
all performers. Intermediate position is occupied by group incentive schemes, when a number of project 
operations are divided into groups, for executors of each of which a unified incentive system is applied. 
 
Formulation of the problem 
Linear incentive systems use the linear function of the time of reduction of operations i ih   , 
where   – the standard for reducing the duration, which is uniform for all operations, i  – is the plan-
ned decrease in the duration of the i-th operations. In the spasmodic incentive system, the premium С to 
the performers of the operation does not depend on the magnitude of the reduction of the operation i  
and is the same for all transactions for which 0i  . 
We consider linear cost functions of the form  
( ) , 1,i i i i iA k i n      , 
where , 1, ;i i iD i n      
0( ) ( ) ( ).i i i i i ih a                         (1) 
For a linear cost function, the minimum costs for performing an operation are equal i i i iB A k D  , 
and the maximum costs i i i iN A k d  . Note that in the absence of stimulation, the duration of the i-th 
operation is , 1,iD i n .  
Let the project be a sequential chain of n operations. Let's assume that the operations are numbered 
in ascending order ik , i. e. 1 2 ... nk k k   . The value iD  defines the standard duration of the i-th ope-
ration, and the value id  – the minimum possible. It is necessary to build an optimal incentive system. 
For the construction of an optimal individual incentive system, we determine such a number j, that is 
1
1 1
( ) ( )
j j
i i i i
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D T    – required reduction in project duration. Operations 
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Determine the total amount of premiums.  
The amount of bonuses for operations 1, 1i j   is ( )i i i i i ih N B k D d    . The amount of bo-
nuses for operation j is 
1
1
( ) ( )
j
j j j j j j j i i
i
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   . 
We construct an optimal unified incentive system. 
Theorem 1. There is a unified system, such that the planned duration of operations for individual and 
unified incentive systems are the same, the standard jk  , and the total amount of premiums is jk  . 
Evidence. Given a standard λ the reduction in duration is possible for operations for which jk   , 
that is, for operations for which the premium is not negative. It follows from condition (1) that jk  , 
and hence the minimum jk  . In this case, all operations for which ik    the planned duration is ob-
tained i jd  . If there are several operations for which ik   , then we assume that the planned duration 
of all such operations except for the operation j, is equal to di, and the planned operation time j is (2). 
The theorem is proved. 






y j i i iН Н k k D d

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Jumping Unified Incentive Systems 
Jumping unified incentive systems are characterized by the fact that premium С is the same for all 
operations for which ij ijD   or 0ij  . 
Let the premium value С be given. In this case, the task is to shorten the duration of the project to 
the required value so that the number of operations with 0ij  s minimal. We show that this problem is 
reduced to a discrete problem of optimizing the network by cost. For a given value of С the maximum 
reduction in the duration of the operation (i, j) is equal to 





    
 
                     (3) 
Thus, the duration of each operation can take two values: the minimum value Dij with zero costs 
(premium) and the minimum value 
ij ij ijE D    
with costs (premium) С for any operation. 
A task. Determine the duration of operations so that the duration of the project was no more (Т – θ), 
and the costs were minimal. 
Discrete optimization problems belong to the class of complex problems of discrete optimization. 
Consider the solution of this problem for aggregated networks. For this it is sufficient to consider  
a solution for a serial and parallel chain. 
Decision. Order the operations in descending order ηi. We define the minimal number of operations 
such that the sum ηi is at least θ. 
For independent (parallel) operations, the problem is solved more simply. 
Solving problems for sequential and parallel operations, we get the dependence S(T) of the premium 
value from Т for the whole aggregate project. 
Example 1. Consider the network of Fig. 1 (operations are arcs). Data on transactions are shown in 
Table. 1. 
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Table 1 
(i, j) (0, 1) (0, 2) (0, 3) (1, 4) (2, 3) (3, 4) 
dij 1 1 1 2 1 3 
Dij 4 2 3 3 3 5 





We will be limited to consideration of C-systems. 
1 step. We consider sequential operations (0, 2), (2, 3). We have a dependence ( )aggrS   
 
τ 2 3 4 5 
aggrS  2с с с 0 
 
2 step. We consider parallel operations (0, 3) and aggregated (0, 3). We have a dependence 03 03( )S   
 
τ 2 3 4 5 
S  3c с c 0 
 
3 step. We consider sequential operations (0, 1), (1, 4). We have a dependence 04 04( )S   
 
τ 3 4 5 6 7 
S 2c с c c 0 
 
4 step. Consider sequential operations aggregated (0, 3) and (3, 4). We have a dependence 0 04'( )S   
 
τ 5 6 7 8 9 10 
S 4c 4c 3c c c 0 
 
5 step. We consider parallel operations (0.4) and (0.4') (both aggregated). We have a dependence S(T) 
 
T 5 6 7 8 9 10 
S 5c 5c 3c c c 0 
 
The described algorithm can be used to obtain lower bounds, transforming an arbitrary network into 
an aggregate. 
 
Group incentive schemes 
Consider the problem of choosing the optimal group incentive system in the following formulation. 
A plan was drawn up to shorten the duration of the project, in which the duration and operations are re-
duced by Δi having the cost function coefficients Ki with a linear incentive system, the incentive rate is 
max i
i
K , and the incentive fund is 
.i
i
                           (4) 
We will set the task of synthesizing the optimal group incentive system for a given number of 
groups m n  (it is clear that when we have an individual incentive system m n ). Let the norms be 
defined 
1 2 ... maxm ii
K        
for each group. We denote by Qj the set of operations for which i jK   . 
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Theorem 2. The j-th group includes operations of the set 1\j jQ Q   (by definition 0Q  ). 
Evidence. Let there be an operation S such that Ks ≤ λj, but 1S Q , where l
 > j. The award to  
the performers of the operation S is equal to l S  . We transfer the operation S to the group j. In this 
case, the premium will be j S  , less than l S  . The theorem is proved. 





Let Ki be numbered in ascending order, that is, K1 ≤ K2 ≤ ... ≤ Kп. 
The arc i, j of the graph reflects the fact that the operations i + 1, т, j belong to one stimulus group, 
and the incentive standard in this group is Kj. Note that any path in a graph joining an input with an out-
put and having т arcs determines uniquely the partition of operations into groups and the corresponding 
norms λj. The reverse is also true, to any partition of the executors of operations in the team into incen-
tive groups there corresponds a certain path in the graph connecting the entrance with the exit. 










                        (5) 
We show that lij is equal to the fund for stimulating the group of operations (i + 1, m, j). 




S i l 
 . 
Consequently, the length of any path from the т arcs connecting the entrance to the exit is equal to 
the value of the incentive fund. 
Task. Define т – is the path (the path containing т arcs) of minimal length. 
This problem is a rather complex task of discrete optimization. Taking into account that the number 
of groups is usually small, the problem can be solved by brute force.  
Example 2. The values Ki, i = 1, 7 are given in Table 2. 
Let т = 3. We fix the value λ1 = Ki and solve the problem for operations i + 1, ..., п and two groups. 
The search of all possible λ1 and allows to determine the optimal system for для т = 3.  
 
Тable 2 
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ki 1 3 4 7 8 10 12 
Δi 5 4 3 6 2 7 4 
 
We assume that the group can not include only one operation. 
1 step. λ1 = 3. 
 
λ2 7 8 
Ф 246 247 
 
Optimum system λ1 = 3, λ2 = 7, Ф = 246. 
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Comparing 3 options, we find the optimal incentive system:  
λ1 = 4,  Q1 = (1, 2, 3); 
λ2 = 8,  Q2\Q1 = (4, 5); 
λ3 = 12,  Q3\Q2 = (6, 7), 
and a minimum incentive fund Ф = 244. 
A similar problem can be solved for the C-stimulus system. Let the operations, the reduction values 
of their durations, and the coefficients Ki be given. The size of the premium is obviously equal to 
max i iС K   
and the incentive fund Ф C n  . 
Let all operations be divided into т groups and numbered in ascending order i iK  , i. e. 
1 1 2 2 ... n nK K K      . Let the bonuses be determined 1 2 ... maxn i iC C C C K      . 
We denote by jQ  the set of operations for which i i jK C  . Then it is obvious that 
max
j
j i ii Q
C K

  , 
and the incentive fund is 
 1, ,j j j
j
C N Q Q                       (6) 
where  1,j jN Q Q   number of operations in the j-th group. 
The problem, like the previous one, reduces to determining the shortest m-paths in a graph with arc 
lengths 
 .ij j jl K j i                          (7) 
With a small number of groups, the problem, like the previous one, can be solved by exhaustive 
search. 
Example 3. Take the data of Example 2. Number of groups т = 3. 
1 step. Take the first group of operations (1, 2), С1 = 12. 
We have two options for groups 2 and 3. In the first variant, the second group (3, 5) with С2 = 16, 
and the third (4, 6, 7) with С3 = 70. The incentive fund is 
Ф = 2∙12 + 2∙16 + 3∙70 = 266. 
In the second variant, the second group (3, 5, 4) with С2 = 42, and the third (6, 7) with С3=70.  
The incentive fund is 
Ф = 2∙12 + 3∙42 + 2∙70 = 190. 
2 step. Take the first group of operations (1, 2, 3), С1 = 12. There is only one option in the second 
group to include operations (5, 4) with С2 = 42, but in the third operation (6, 7) with С3 = 70. The incen-
tive fund is 
Ф = 3∙12 + 2∙42 + 2∙70 = 260. 
Optimal is the option (1, 2, 3), (5, 4), (6, 7) with the fund 260. 
In this case, the group L-system is more effective than the group C-system. However, we can cite 
problems in which the group C-system is more effective (for the same number of groups). 
 
Conclusion 
Group incentive systems occupy an intermediate place between individual systems and unified 
systems. They to some extent reduce the shortcomings of individual systems, as they generate compe-
tition both within groups and between groups and at the same time, as a rule, more effective than uni-
fied ones. The problem of constructing optimal group systems for arbitrary network graphs, and  
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СИСТЕМЫ СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЯ В УПРАВЛЕНИИ ПРОЕКТАМИ 
 
С.А. Баркалов1, В.Н. Бурков2, Н.Ю. Калинина1, Т.В. Насонова1 
1 Воронежский государственный технический университет, г. Воронеж, Россия, 
2 Институт проблем управления им. В.А. Трапезникова Российской академии наук,  
г. Москва, Россия 
 
 
Анализ современного состояния управления проектами показывает существенное увели-
чение количества проектов, реализуемых в сферах строительства, государственного управле-
ния, энергетики, цифровых технологий. Понимая важность будущего развития, руководители 
организаций применяют методы управления проектами для создания конкурентных преиму-
ществ, а в прикладной теории управления организационными системами все большее внима-
ние уделяется командной деятельности персонала организации. 
Важная задача в управлении проектной командой – формирование системы стимулиро-
вания ее участников, задача которой – обеспечить выполнение проекта в срок без дополни-
тельных расходов бюджета. В целях поддержания мотивации участников проектных команд 
применяются индивидуальные и унифицированные системы стимулирования.  
Недостатком индивидуальных систем стимулирования является, во-первых, неравные 
условия поощрения различных групп исполнителей, а во-вторых, опасность манипулирова-
ния, то есть сознательного искажения информации об объемах работ и затратах, передавае-
мой от членов проектной команды. Для того чтобы исключить искажение информации и сни-
зить напряженность в команде проекта, применяют унифицированные системы стимулирова-
ния, когда механизм стимулирования один и тот же для всех исполнителей. Промежуточное 
положение занимают групповые системы стимулирования, когда множество операций проек-
та разбивается на группы, для исполнителей каждой из которых применяется унифицирован-
ная система стимулирования. 
В статье рассматриваются скачкообразные унифицированные системы стимулирования, 
и решается задача выбора оптимальной групповой системы стимулирования. 
Ключевые слова: проект, команда, объединенные унифицированные системы стимули-
рования, групповые системы стимулирования. 
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